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Abstract 
While some theorists in International Relations have engaged with thinking about 
complexity we would argue that few have thought it through to its logical conclusion 
– the interconnectedness of systems, and the implications for agency and structure. 
This paper examines the structure/agency question using the framework of 
‘posthuman international relations’. This draws on recent thinking in complexity and 
argues for an approach to the study of global politics that is post-Newtonian and 
non-anthropocentric.  Key elements of a complexity based approach are examined, 
and it is argued that these provide a novel way of considering issues of agency and 
structure. They also raise issues for the analysis of agency and the link between 
actions and outcomes. Complex systems can present problems of analysis related to 
unpredictability, causality, and non-linearity. 
 
Having laid out a framework for thinking about action and context in international 
politics, the paper turns to questions of agency and practice within complex systems. 
Perhaps the most significant claim here is that it is possible to conceive of agency 
beyond the human. Drawing upon Margaret Archer’s discussions of primary and 
corporate agency, a three-fold approach to thinking about structure and agency is 
developed, which allows us to think about agency beyond the human. Finally, an 
explanation is given as to why a complex approach to thinking about international 
relations ultimately implies a posthuman perspective. 
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The agent-structure question in International Relations ranks alongside the so-called 
‘great debates’ within the discipline. In terms of its duration it probably far outlives 
any of the other debates. At one level it can appear to be arcane and irrelevant to 
the study of the world politics. We would concur with Colin Wight that there is no 
answer. 0F1 For there to be one answer would assume that structures and agents are 
invariant. Any piece of research will have come to an answer to the structure-agency 
problem even if implicitly. The answer to the question will depend on the particular 
circumstances being investigated. 
 
Despite the rather abstract quality of the debate, and the probability that it can 
never be resolved, the questions raised go to the heart of the discipline, both in 
terms of what is the object of study, and crucially, what are the possibilities for 
agency. The structure agency question is significant in terms of ontology because it 
focuses on the question of who the actors might be in international politics. Are we 
discussing individuals; some form of institution, whether states, international 
organisations, transnational organisations, and criminal gangs; or, as we will argue 
subsequently, agency beyond the human? Additionally, what are the circumstances 
in which they act – what contexts limit or enable certain actions – the international 
system, the capitalist system, patriarchy? What then are we studying when we study 
international relations? The structure agency question also prompts a second and 
crucial line of inquiry – what space is there for agency? While the ontological 
question asked what makes up international relations, and what the circumstances 
in which they might operate are, the second question prompts us to consider what 
potential is there for action. Based on the assumption that we study international 
politics in the hope of contributing to the fostering of an alternate world rather than 
rubbernecking the horrors of the present one, then this question becomes vital. If 
we are simply the playthings of structures then we should consider retiring to our 
allotments now. Yet clearly practice is more than simply wishing for a more just 
social order, and if that is what we wish to promote then we need an analysis of 
those social forces that impede practice.  
 
We have recently made a call for a Posthuman International Relations.1 F2 This draws 
on recent thinking in complexity leading to the intention of developing an approach 
to the study of global politics that is post-Newtonian and non-anthropcentric. In this 
paper we examine the structure agency question using this framework. In the next 
section we examine key elements of a complexity based approach. These we argue 
provide a novel way of considering issues of agency and structure. Having laid out a 
framework for thinking about action and context in international politics we turn to 
questions of agency and practice within complex systems. Finally we explain our 
claim about why a complex approach to thinking about international relations 
ultimately implies a posthuman perspective. 
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Complexity Theory and Complex Adaptive Systems 
 
Any discussion of complexity theory needs to be prefaced by some contextualizing 
remarks. There is ‘no unified theory of complexity’.2F3 The term can be used to 
describe a variety of theoretical positions which draw upon a similar conceptual 
lexicon while having radically different epistemological and ontological perspectives. 
Elsewhere we have identified four different ways in which complexity theory has 
been applied in the social sciences. 3F4 Oversimplifying the situation slightly, a 
distinction can be drawn between ‘number crunchers’ and ‘philosophers’. This 
distinction aligns approximately, though not absolutely, with an Atlantic divide, thus 
we have the ‘number crunchers’ primarily operating from the US, and the 
‘philosophical’ position primarily being a European perspective. 
 
The character of this divide has been summarized by Edgar Morin as a distinction 
between ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ complexity. 4F5 From a ‘restricted’ perspective, 
complexity exists but can be tamed, in the sense that given enough mathematical 
and computer capacity law-like statements can be generated with regard to its 
effects. For example, Mark Buchanan argues that despite the presence of complexity 
‘it may be possible to discover mathematical laws and meaningful patterns in the 
human world.’5F6 As far as Morin is concerned this reflects a ‘restricted’ view of 
complexity which while it ‘recognises complexity’ seeks to go about ‘decomplexifying 
it’ and ‘remains within the epistemology of classical science.’ 6F7 The restricted 
approach overlooks the inherent characteristics of complexity. For Morin the 
analysis of complexity requires a complete reconsideration of how we think about 
the world. We would regard our particular understanding of complexity to be much 
closer to Morin’s concept of ‘general complexity’, one which cannot be tamed 
mathematically and perceives a broad unpredictability to existence and a hard to 
determine relationship between causes and effects. This is not to say that 
meaningful statements cannot be made about the world and, crucially, about the 
possibilities for change, but they do have to made within the context of a ‘general 
complexity’ – the implications of which will become clearer as we proceed. 
 
Having stated our broad epistemological position, we will outline the key concepts of 
our particular perspective, and relate these to questions of structure and agency in 
international relations. Here we discuss three overlapping and interdependent 
concepts – complex adaptive systems, self-organization and emergence, which all 
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represent ways of considering the relationships between actors and between actors 
and system. 
 
 
Complex Adaptive Systems  
  
We live, as Mario Bunge has indicated in a ‘world of systems.’ 7F8 Everything above the 
level of the most elementary particles is a system of one form or another. This 
extends from atoms, through molecules, cells, bodies and upwards into social 
systems, solar systems, galaxies to finally, perhaps, the universe. From a complexity 
perspective these systems share certain common features, and all systems provide 
the environment for all other systems – in that sense we exist in a totally (to 
whatever minimal extent) interconnected universe.  
 
A system in this sense indicates the possibility of drawing a notional boundary 
around a certain group of elements that indicates a certain degree of autonomy. 8F9 
Systems overlap and intersect with other systems, but can be distinguished from the 
remainder of the environment. One human body (itself made up of multiple 
systems) can be distinguished from its environment, but interacts with its 
environment in multiple ways – it takes on other systems in the form of food (plant 
and animal systems), is constantly invaded by other systems (in the form of viruses), 
its actions are contribute to and are constrained by social, political and economic 
systems, and ultimately it will be dissipated into a range of other systems. A global 
economic system intersects and overlaps with a system of states, local economic and 
social systems, corporations and individuals. In this sense, complex systems are said 
to be ‘open’ rather than closed.  
 
A second feature of complex adaptive systems is that rather than being fixed, they 
are inherently dynamic, and react to their environment. They are ‘adaptive’. Central 
to this dynamism is the notion of feedback. Much traditional systems analysis has 
focused on the idea of feedback as leading towards equilibrium – described as 
negative feedback. Complexity thinking suggests that in addition to negative 
feedback we also need to consider positive feedback – forces which take a system 
further away from equilibrium and to greater instability. Systems can adapt to 
internal disturbance, for example ways in which the human body deals with its 
internal deterioration, or external influences – the global economic systems will be 
affected by events in the political system.  
 
Robert Ulanowicz argues that we can draw distinctions between a conventional or 
Newtonian notion of systems and complex, or ecological systems. 9F10 Newtonian 
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systems are causally closed in the sense that developments in the system can only 
be explained with reference to the elements of the system. They are deterministic, 
implying that it is possible to predict future events. Newtonian systems are also 
reversible, in that the laws governing behaviour operate in both ways. In other 
words there are no historical developments within such systems. These systems are 
atomistic in that there is a mechanical relationship between the parts and the whole. 
The system can be dis-assembled and then reconstructed.  
 
By contrast complex systems are open. Changes in the system can potentially be 
explained by internal or external features, or both. Events within a complex system 
are contingent rather than deterministic. They are irreversible, because the 
character of the system and the elements within in it are constantly changing. 
Complex systems are historical in that ‘irregularities often take the form of 
discontinuities, which degrade predictability into the future and obscure 
hindcasting.’10F11 Finally complex systems are organic rather than atomistic, and as a 
result are not easily decomposed and re-assembled. Consider, for example taking a 
rain forest apart and re-assembling it.  
 
 
Self-Organisation 
 
Underlying the notion of self-organization is the idea that there are patterns of 
behaviour in the interactions of matter. Rather than matter being solely involved in 
chaotic behaviour, there are regularities which emerge even if they are contingent 
and temporary. For Morin, organization is more than simple interactions and self-
organization is crucial in understanding the driving forces behind the emergence of 
systems.11F12 In other words organization isn’t just the process of interactions which 
create the system. It is an on-going process which maintains the system as an 
autonomous within its environment. It is what maintains the system as a system and 
involves a certain degree of differentiating it from the systems around it.12F13 
 
An underlying assumption of complexity thinking in the study of the social world is 
that these processes are also a feature of human interaction. Self-organization is 
seen as a spontaneous and non-directed process. This implies continuity between 
human and non-human nature. Our perspective is that features such as self-
organization do manifest themselves in human systems in addition to non-human 
systems. However there are specific characteristics of human systems. Westley et al 
point to some specific features of human systems, in particular the human capacity 
for abstract thought, which actually increases self-organisation.13F14 
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Emergence 
 
If complex adaptive systems mark the cornerstone of complex thinking, and self-
organization indicates an inherent tendency for matter to interact in dynamic 
patterns, then the concept of emergence provides the link between the two. 
 
The character of the system that emerges from the interaction at the unit level is 
unpredictable. For complexity thinkers the form that any system will take is not 
predictable in advance. There is also some doubt in complex systems as to whether 
the form that a complex system takes can be causally traced back to its original 
features with any degree of certainty. A classic example of this would be 
consciousness. From a complexity perspective consciousness is an emergent feature 
of the interactions of the brain. Consciousness could not be predicted from an 
examination of the parts of the brain, or the way in which they function.  
 
Complexity thinkers argue that the emergent features of a complex adaptive system 
always represent something more than the sum of the parts. The character of 
complex system cannot be understood by simply combining the component parts. 14F15 
There are new features which in some way constitute an added element which is 
only perceptible at the system level. These features although a characteristic of the 
interactions of the component parts cannot be understood simply as the interactions 
of the parts, but have to be studied at a systemic level. 15F16 The idea of emergence also 
implies that systems are less than the sum of their parts. For Morin systems, in 
addition to the new features that they exhibit, also place constraints on the actions 
of the components.16F17 In other words an emergent feature of complex adaptive 
systems is the restrictions that complex systems place on the elements. Hence 
systems as well as being more than the sum of the parts, are also ‘less’ in the sense 
that they remove some of the freedom of action of the component parts in the way 
of constraints. 
 
Emergence is also a transformative process. As Morin puts it ‘everything which forms 
transforms.’ 17F18 This points to the dynamism of a complex adaptive system as changes 
at the unit level will also imply new forms of emergence at the systemic level. If we 
take the European Union as an example of a complex system, then we would expect 
the member states to have been transformed by their membership. They are not the 
same states that formed the organization, and the organization itself has also 
changed as a result of transformations at the unit level.  
 
The concept of emergence is inherent then in understanding complexity thinking as 
an alternative perspective because it provides the explanation for why emergent 
features are ‘logically undeducible and physically irreducible’ to the component 
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parts.18F19 So what does this imply for thinking about structure and agency in 
international relations?  
 
 
Agents and Structures in the Study of International Relations 
 
Any analysis of the social world provides an implicit answer to the structure agency 
problem in that it discusses agents and the context in which they operate. David 
Dessler sums this up clearly when he observes, that there are ‘two uncontentious 
truths about social life: first, that human agency is the only moving force behind the 
actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency 
can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the 
possibilities for action and influence its course.’ 19F20 That agency and structure has been 
viewed as a problem in International Relations indicates that there are issues and 
implications in the choice of what or who acts in international politics and the 
possible constraints within which action occurs. A number of articles have referred 
specifically to issues of agency and structure. Although not specifically focused on 
agents and structures as a problem, David Singer’s 1961 article ‘The Level of Analysis 
Problem in International Relations’ is probably one of the most cited articles in the 
discipline.20F21 Singer’s argument concerns state action and the levels at which it might 
be studied.  
By contrast Waltz had argued that there were three levels of analysis - human, state 
and system.21F22 Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is often taken as the definitive 
systemic statement of IR. 22F23 While often depicted as being determinist at the systems 
level, another interpretation is to see the international system as enabling and 
constraining. The degree that states are structural dupes fluctuates in Waltz’s work, 
so that while he regards theoretical approaches that operate at the state level as 
reductionist and unable to tell the whole story.23F24 For Waltz states are not the dupes 
of structural forces, but are liable to pay the costs of not conforming to structural 
priorities. For a really system orientated account of IR we need to look to 
Wallerstein’s World System theory. For Wallerstein the international system was 
completely determining and the source of all unit level phenomena. 24F25 Not only are 
these features products of the system, their room for action is fundamentally 
constrained as ‘within a functioning historical system there is no genuine free will.’ 25F26 
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Waltz’s systemic approach was the catalyst for agency/structure discussions in the 
late 1980s and 1990s in particular drawing on a Critical or Scientific Realist 
perspective.26F27 Wendt criticised both Waltz and Wallerstein for being ‘ontologically 
primitive’, though in different ways – Waltzian Structural Realism found its 
ontological focus at the state level, whilst Wallerstinian world-system theory found 
its ontological focus at the system level. The problem was that both confronted ‘an 
inability to explain the properties and causal powers of their primary units of 
analysis.27F28’ The answer, for Wendt, was structuration. His critique of Waltz prompted 
a debate carried out in the pages of Review of International Studies over the extent 
to which Waltz’s theory could be described as structuralist. 28F29 
In the late 1990s  Roxanne Lyn Doty entered the discussion with a contribution from 
a poststructuralist perspective.29F30 Lyn Doty made some significant criticisms of the 
discussions thus far, in particular the view that the structure agency debate had 
emphasized a dualism in ideas about agency and structure. Lyn Doty suggested as an 
alternative focus on practice.  
 
The most comprehensive discussion on this topic is to be found in Colin Wight’s book 
Agents Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology. As well as 
providing a comprehensive survey of all the contributions to date, the book outlines 
his critical/scientific perspective on the question, drawing in particular on the works 
of Ray Bhasker. The book is a series of ‘ontological investigations’ into how questions 
of agency and structure have played out within international relations. 30F31 Wight 
argues for a view of structures and agents drawing on the work of Bhasker and 
Margaret Archer:  
 
Structure… binds the various planes *of which there are four: material; intersubjective; 
social; subjectivity+ of the social world together… it links them and provides a way to 
integrate agents and structures in one account… agents and social structure are neither 
contradictory nor complementary terms, but rather represent two poles which stand in 
a relation of tension with one another… social structure is reproduced and transformed 
through the actions of agents, it is also the case that the range of possibilities available 
to individuals and groups is differentially distributed and structurally circumscribed. 31F
32
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What is perhaps quite remarkable about the structure-agency debate in 
international relations is its incredibly limited focus. Certainly the introduction of 
scientific/critical realist contributions from Bhaskar and Archer has contributed to a 
much more comprehensive account of the relationship between structures and 
agents. In particular the notion of emergent systems is central to this perspective. An 
engagement with complexity thinking draws our attention to a number of additional 
features of systems.  
 
Firstly no system is isolated in the way that structure agency discussions appear to 
imply. The environment for any system is provided by all other systems. Hence the 
international system will be affected by interactions with other systems, for 
example, the global food production system. 32F33 Systems for complexity thinking can 
also be composed of heterogeneous units. Hence thinking about an international 
system might lead to the consideration of a variety of units – individuals, states, 
international organisations, INGOs, and so on. Complexity thinking also draws our 
attention to the embedded character of systems. Human systems are likewise 
additionally embedded in a range of non-human systems – this has implications for 
the development of each. The international system is not only impacted by 
developments within the system, but also though interactions with a number of non-
human systems, for example the weather. 
 
 
Differentiated Agency in Complex World 
 
In this section we want to use complexity ideas and conceptions from posthumanism 
to further problematise the structure-agency debate in international relations and its 
incredibly limited focus. As we have seen, the central claim of complexity thinking is 
that we live in a world of systems, each potentially involved in interaction with any 
other system. However, we clearly need to differentiate between systems, and social 
systems, in particular human social systems exhibit specific characteristics. Mario 
Bunge has usefully distinguished between ‘biologism’ which views human society as 
‘just one more animal society’, and ‘spiritualism’ which views human society as 
‘nothing of the sort because it is guided by ideas and values’. Rather ‘human society 
is an animal society with many and remarkable properties’, the human ‘is neither an 
animal at the mercy of its genetic makeup and its environment, nor a free spiritual 
being akin to divinity.’ 33F34  
 
For us however, whilst this problematizes the notion of the human (as above and 
beyond the ‘animal’) it retains the basic divide between human animals (with their 
special features) and all other animals. This underplays the essentially Darwinian 
notion of species as a process of differentiation rather than difference, and the 
complexity conception of evolution as a multiple process – co-evolution. Here, we 
are going to focus directly on posthumanist ideas and consider what questions these 
raise first, for agency in general, and second, for understanding the possibilities of 
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agency in international politics. We are going to suggest that we need a 
differentiated account of agency which both broadens and specifies our conceptual 
repertoire. The first step in this task is to consider why agency is considered an 
exclusively human property.  
 
From evolution to revolution 
 
Now, comrades, what is the nature of this life of ours? Let us face it: our lives are miserable, 
laborious and short. We are born, we are given so much food as will keep the breath in our 
bodies, and those of us who are capable of it are forced to work to the last atom of our 
strength; and the very instant that our usefulness has come to an end we are slaughtered 
with hideous cruelty.… 
  
Why do we then continue in our miserable condition? Because nearly the whole of the 
produce of our labour is stolen from us by human beings. There, comrades, is the answer to 
all our problems. It is summed up in a single word – Man. Man is the only real enemy we 
have. (Major the pig, exhorting the animals of Manor Farm to ‘rebellion’, from George Orwell 
Animal Farm 1949: 11-12) 
 
And inspired by the ideas of Major, pigs lead farmed animals in the revolutionary 
overthrow of their human oppressors and institute a new regime for a new world – 
‘Animal Farm’.  Orwell’s book is read as a satire because it would be ludicrous to 
read it any other way – pigs are pigs and human beings remake their worlds. That, is 
just ‘the way things are’ as the malevolent cat informs the pig who would be a 
sheepdog, in Dick King-Smith’s children’s novel. The concept of agency has almost 
always been understood as applying to beings with wills, desires and intentions. It 
has been seen as a capacity for action which (usually) is a product of social relations, 
a relationally generated capacity. This capacity is what makes us human. Agency is 
concerned with the ways in which our world is reproduced and recast. Whilst non-
human beings and things evolve, we humans, we political animals, go about planning 
and changing our world. 
 
At least, this is our common understanding. In the US sci-fi film, the Rise of the 
Planet of the Apes (Dir. Rupert Wyatt, 2011) however, we see non-human Great 
Apes become revolutionary subjects. The film’s main protagonist, Caesar, has 
enhanced intelligence passed on from his mother, a laboratory chimpanzee tested 
with gene therapy drugs intended to cure Alzheimer’s disease in humans. When the 
research companies’ laboratory chimps are culled after a false alarm about drug 
side-effects, Caesar is taken home and raised by one of the scientists. In the house, 
Caesar occupies various roles - a very well-cared for laboratory subject, a child and a 
pet. Outside the home, he is viewed by strangers as a dangerous addition to the 
suburban idyll. After an incident with a neighbour in which Caesar displays 
aggression, thereby behaving too much like a chimpanzee, he is handed over to a 
primate ‘sanctuary’ in which human keepers abuse the non-human Great Apes in 
their care and where Caesar finds himself isolated from, and bullied by, his own 
‘kind’. Caesars advanced intelligence however, enables him to make alliances and 
subdue enemies and incite other non-human Great Apes to rebellion.  He 
orchestrates their exposure to Alzheimer treatment, their escape from the primate 
centre and the liberation of other Great Apes from a laboratory and a zoo, to the 
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sanctuary of a redwood forest nature reserve. Misanthropy is a key theme of the 
film, which ends with the hint that whilst new Alzheimer drugs enhance intelligence 
in other Great Apes, in humans they have terrible and contagious side effects.  
 
Certainly, in a context of abuse by medical testing and incarceration, and of 
vulnerability in a human centred system of social relations, Caesar and his comrades 
have much to be angry about. But this is not a posthumanist film. Rather, it is a 
transhumanist one – non-humans are enhanced by the incorporation of human 
qualities.  The Rise of the Planet of the Apes is an old fashioned tale of revolution in 
which non-human Great Apes have agency to the extent that they can become 
human, or are subject to ‘uplift’. There are two indicators of the possibilities for ape 
rebellion: reflexivity and a particular kind of communication, language. Caesar 
demonstrates both these qualities and at this point it seems only polite to bring him 
into conversation with Margaret Archer. Luckily for Margaret, Caesar’s awakening as 
an uplifted subject does not mean that he fully embraces enlightened chimpdom. He 
keeps his trousers on.  
  
 
Archer, agency and the uplifted chimpanzee 
 
In much posthumanist work, whether in Science Technology and Society (STS), 
political geography, animal studies or elsewhere, the term ‘agency’ is broadly 
defined and used in different ways. For example, agency is often used to refer to a 
being with the capacity for action. Action is usually defined as the ability to make 
decisions, choose options and thereby act. Agency is seen as a causal power invested 
in singular entities – persons, beings or ‘things’. In some cases it is implied that 
agency is a universal property of sentient beings. Leslie Irvine, for example, identifies 
dogs as ‘agentic beings’34F35 with agency defined as ‘the capacity for self-willed 
action’.35F36  
 
For Archer, this commits the sin of conflation. What people like Irvine do is to 
muddle the capacity for action, which dogs or chimpanzees clearly have, with 
agency. Archer makes a distinction between ‘actors’ who are singular, and ‘agents’ 
who are plural.36F37 Agents are collectivities formed by those who share the same life 
chances. This position is involuntary because the social relations within which we 
may find ourselves, and the advantages or disadvantages they imply, predate our 
arrival. So, agents come into being in historically and geographically specific and 
contingent locations in society’s distribution of resources. From birth, we are 
enmeshed with the structural relations of society and relations of social power. The 
extent to which we can exercise choice and act on the decisions we make is linked to 
these structural relations. Born into a captive life as a research tool for human gain, 
Caesar does not have the best start in life, nor would any other chimpanzee so 
placed. Non-human animal being and lives are shaped by their locations within a 
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distribution of resources where their habitats and their bodies are subject to human 
interests and depredation. Their lives are subordinated to the desires and whims of 
humans and the material conditions for their survival are frequently disregarded. 
Archer calls this involuntary placement in social relations ‘primary agency’, and there 
is no reason other than religious belief or humanist prejudice perhaps, why this 
cannot be extended beyond the boundaries of the human to other species. This 
placement however, is insufficient for either Major the pig or Caesar the chimp to 
rebel against their oppression by social structures which privilege the human. 
 
After hours free in the trees of a nature reserve, Caesar is called back ‘home’ and 
taken to the car on a leash. On seeing a dog similarly tethered, is troubled by the 
multiple identities of pet and almost-human companion he is expected to occupy. 
Later, in his cage in the primate centre, he shares his experiences of frustration in 
sign language with a fellow-signing orang-utan. Here, Caesar the individual is 
reflecting upon the involuntary and oppressive situation in which he finds himself 
and the arbitrary and unjust nature of human power. He recognises what he shares 
in common with the other primates and orchestrates collective action to challenge 
human power and change the life situation of some of his fellows. For Archer, this 
would be an illustration of the move from primary agency to corporate agency, 
albeit Archer’s discussion of corporate agency is on the firmly humanist territory of 
the emergence of social movements. 
 
Whilst Archer herself would have no truck with animals, Bob Carter and Nickie 
Charles use Archer to inject some rigour into discussions of agency in sociological 
animal studies. For them, animals can possess primary agency but are unable to 
move from this to corporate agency. This is because they lack: 
 
The recognition of shared life chances, an assessment of their possible causes and 
judgements about possible political remedies requires the mobilisation of political, cultural 
and linguistic resources... 37F
38
 
 
Carter and Charles allow that the sociality and sociability of many animal species is 
well established including recognition of hierarchies, socialisation of infants and 
struggles over resources. Indeed, they suggest that forms of sociality amongst 
human and non-human animals are perhaps best viewed as a continuum, extending 
from those animals for which sociality is meaningless, through to those with 
extensive sociality, such as dogs, horses and higher primates. However, for them the 
development of syntactical language amongst humans marks a qualitative break 
with this continuum.  
 
Here Carter and Charles effectively reproduce the distinction between ‘first’ and 
’second’ nature found in Jonathan Balcome’s work. Balcome warns us that science is 
rapidly revealing evidence that all kinds of animal species ‘are more aware and more 
                                            
38
 Bob Carter and Nickie Charles, ‘Human–Animal Connections:  An Introduction’, in Human and 
Other Animals: Critical Perspectives, eds. Bob Carter and Nickie Charles (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), 
12. 
13 
 
sophisticated than we thought’.38F39 However, language enables further cultural 
emergent properties, setting humans on a qualitatively different evolutionary course 
to other animals. The distinction between first and second nature underpins earlier 
work by the social ecologist Murry Bookchin to describe human exceptionalism, in 
terms of community diversity, language and use of technology. 39F40 A further 
distinction is institutionalized hierarchy, an ‘exclusive characteristic of second 
nature.’40F41 Carter and Charles similarly suggest that the symbol-laden nature of 
human social life means that the struggles over resources are political for humans 
whereas for animals ‘the struggles over who gets what, when and how take a 
different form’.41F42 To substantiate this claim, Carter and Charles use Frans de Waal’s 
work on chimpanzees, yet it is uncertain that de Waal’s research supports their 
argument. De Waal explicitly argues that chimpanzees do have politics and that ‘the 
social organization of chimpanzees is almost too human to be true’.42F43 De Waal 
argues chimpanzee politics operates at two levels: the formal hierarchical system of 
rank (which is negotiated and socially formalised); and the networks of influence 
through which chimpanzees build coalitions, engage in exchange and maintain the 
balance of power. De Waal’s chimpanzees may be rather feudal in their politicking 
for contemporary democratic tastes, but political animals they are. 
 
We would concur with Ted Benton that syntactical language is part of the ‘mode of 
life’ which is ‘peculiar’ to human beings and ‘the outcome of *a+ unique evolutionary 
history’.43F44 We would not accept however, that without this specific kind of 
communication all kinds of non-human species are excluded from what Archer calls 
corporate agency. Benton argues that many species have overlapping forms of 
‘species life’ with humans and that we should think about ‘differentiations’ rather 
than differences.44F45 Differentiations of species, and particular social, economic and 
ecological contexts give rise to different categories of human animal relationship. In 
addition, there are non-lingual forms of communication which species may share.45F46  
So Caesar can plot and plan, scheme and manipulate, without the uplifting effects of 
intelligence enhancing drugs. De Waal’s chimpanzees indeed managed to 
orchestrate a group escape from their enclosure. But unlike Caesar, they did not 
challenge their domination by humans. There are two questions to be asked here. 
First, is it because, not having been subjected to ‘uplift’, they cannot know that they 
are dominated? Or, second, is it because they chose not so to act in the 
circumstances in which they found themselves. 
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For Archer, Carter and Charles the answer is straightforward – chimpanzees cannot 
know they are dominated. Language is necessary for reflexivity and this is ‘critically 
dependent on the linguistic ability to hold an “internal conversation” with oneself’.46F47 
For Archer, the ‘internal conversation’ is the ability to order our concerns, to 
consider judgments and make decisions on the basis of them, leading to increased 
self-knowledge.47F48 Carter and Charles argue that language capacity is what enables 
the capacity to have awareness of one’s own consciousness. This is why, they might 
argue, Caesar needed the drugs. The work of animal beviouralists however 
increasingly suggests that some non-humans, despite being without language, seem 
able to think about the future and engage in forward planning. Those like Bekoff 
would err on the side of caution when it comes to claims about what animals might 
or might not be able to do. We would concur. It is possible for some non-human 
species to be reflexive? It would not surprise us if they were but we do not know. 
We would suggest that critical realists like Archer, Carter and Charles do not ‘know’ 
that this is impossible, either. In response to the second question, we would pose 
another. What might it mean to be reflexive when you are a chimpanzee born into 
captivity in a society in which species relations overwhelmingly privilege the human 
and non-humans are exploited and depredated? As Carol Adams and Marjorie 
Proctor (1993) have remarked, a lack of contestation must not be interpreted as a 
sign of complicity when it comes to those species over which we exercise 
overwhelming power and control. 48F49 What animals may or may not reflect on, and 
what their possible actions might be a given situation, is extraordinarily difficult to 
ascertain. To assume that animals are unaware of, are complicit in, or benefit from, 
the oppressive institutions and practices into which we place them is an assumption 
easily made and conveniently undisruptive for human interests. 
 
So, what might we draw thus far from placing Caesar in the room with Margaret? 
Margaret Archer, Caesar and the chimpanzees in de Waals’ study are all agential 
beings and we would suggest that in addition, they all have agency. It is of different 
kinds however, and this is the important intervention that Archer makes. Archer’s 
differentiation between ‘primary’ and ‘corporate’ agency is useful. The idea that 
agential beings emerge into a pre-existent web of social relations is vital to 
understanding the possibilities of agency. We prefer to talk about this placement in a 
situation of unequally distributed power and resources as ‘reproductive agency’. 
Herein, agential beings are placed in a context of social institutions and social 
relations and their practices over time reproduce those institutions and relations, 
with relatively minor alterations. Placement in contexts of inequality means that 
relations are not always apparent and the behaviour of agential beings often 
reproduces such patterns. Both humans and non-human agential beings and things 
have this reproductive agency. We also suggest a secondary form of agency which 
draws on Archer’s notion of corporate agency. ‘Transformative agency’ is a term we 
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would use to describe the cultural struggle over resources and social organization to 
effect differences in that distribution. Whilst this is very much associated with 
humans, some species of non-humans have this capacity for social action and may 
even in Archer’s terms have a relationally generated capacity for such action. We 
have focused thus far on humans and non-humans who are relatively close to them. 
What of the agential powers of distant beings and things? What of the effects of 
natural systems – these have causal powers and emergent properties, but might 
they also have agency? In order to discuss these questions we need to look at some 
the perspectives on agency more commonly associated with ‘posthumanist’ 
approaches, and here we develop a third concept of agency, ‘affective agency’. 
 
 
Posthumanism and accounts of agency 
 
The history of political theory has ascribed political will and agency to humans alone. 
Even those contemporary thinkers with challenging and radical notions of the nature 
of decision making in democratic political institutions, consider that (human) speech 
is the medium of politics.49F50  Those political theorists with environmental credentials 
have also cast both technologies and ‘natures’ as outside of political life – as the 
objects of political attention rather than political agents with affect and causality.50F51  
Those experimenting with radical notions of ‘environmental democracy’ have only 
experimented so far, and tend to conceive of politics as a human-exclusive sphere of 
activity and democratic decision-making that is separate from the objects over which 
democratic deliberation takes place.51F52 Posthumanism can be broadly understood to 
be the decentering of human beings and human interests, and raises fundamental 
questions for our human-exclusive conceptions of the political, including political 
actors and the constitution of agency.52F53  
 
Posthumanism has been influential in disrupting the binary categories of western 
philosophy such as nature/culture or human/animal and there are various strands 
and projects. Particularly influential has been science, technology and society (STS) 
approaches.53F54 Enter stage left, Bruno Latour, whose work has consistently 
problematized our humancentric ways of seeing the ‘social’ world, albeit that he 
does not approve of the term posthumanism itself. Latour’s influential Actor 
Network Theory holds that agency may be attributed to any object or ‘actant’, 
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temporarily constituted by the emergent web of ‘materially heterogeneous 
relations’.54F55 Here, agency is inflated conceptually (so that it becomes simply a 
capacity for action) and extensively (so that anything that has an effect on 
something else is seen as an actor or actant, from fishermen to scallops).55F56 In the 
networks of ANT, any material entity can have agency, including all non-human 
animal species and inanimate objects. Other posthumanist positions lend themselves 
to progressive political projects such as those characterising critical animal studies, 
political ecologism, feminism and others.56F57 It has been suggested that exploitative 
and oppressive relations exist and must be taken seriously, and that their challenge 
has seen the emergence of a post-humanist, non-anthropocentric way of 
understanding and relating to other animals and the natural world more generally.57F58 
These developments are more congruent with our own position because in such 
accounts, the binaries can also be understood in terms of systemic relations of social 
power that we would see challenged.  
 
John Law’s version of ANT focuses on the practices and performances which create 
realities as material.58F59 Different realities are created by different kinds of practices. 
This however, is problematic when applied to Law’s example of cattle, which exist 
together with farmers in a web of relations which ‘produces them as different’.59F60 
This is problematic in two ways. First, as Ted Benton points out, cattle are creatures 
with a specific material existence and powers and properties which are not context 
dependent.60F61 Second, how we understand the web of relations which brings cattle 
into being, depends on how we conceptualize the web – whether cattle and farmers 
are co-producers of human food and of a specific spatial configuration by their use of 
land, or whether cattle are living commodities, embedded in relations of exploitation 
in the local, regional and global networks of the industrial production of the human 
resources of milk and meat. Law’s web of productive relations is both simple (it is 
understood in a singular, local or regional dimension) and flat (non-hierarchical).  
Cattle breeds have certainly been brought into existence a web of relations, literally 
and materially, for they would not exist without the dairy and meat industries, but 
this is not Law’s main concern. The flat, non-hierarchical networks for ANT cannot 
deal with power because it cannot make distinctions between nature and society, or 
for that matter, between humans, other animals, plants and objects. In theorizing 
power, we need such distinctions. As Benton argues, the categories of species, 
however problematic, retain some saliency because there are distinct features of 
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species life which some ‘species’ possess in relation to others. This means that our 
ideas of agency must vary with species. In addition, we need to acknowledge the 
systemic relations shaping collective agency and agential power. We argued above 
for a conception of differentiated agency in which the agential being of non-human 
animals, particularly mammals is countenanced, and the possibilities for agency very 
much depends on the relational systems which produce such being. What, then, of 
far more distant beings and even ‘things’?  
 
Jane Bennett argues for a ‘vital materialism’ in order to recognize the role of 
apparently inanimate matter affecting and configuring situations and events. 61F62 
Bennett’s argument about the animism of all things resonates in different ways with 
the complexity understandings of Capra (1996) and of neuroscientists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela.62F63 However, in Spinozist vital materialism there is a 
tendency to minimize the differences between subjects and objects with this notion 
of a vitality which runs through both human and non-human matter. The end in view 
is the development of a more environmentally aware and cautious politics, but the 
elevation of the ‘shared materiality of all things’ is a rather blunt instrument in 
securing this end.63F64 Bennett’s (2004) notion of ‘thing power’ understands agentic 
capacity as distributed ‘across a range of ontological types.’ 64F65  In describing an 
electric grid as an assemblage of vital material and in her use of the term emergent 
properties, Bennett is actually close to the notion of a complex system.65F66 For 
Bennett, non-human assemblages, can act. However, what she actually means is that 
assemblages can have an impact or effect on humans and non-humans. Herein lays a 
version of the problem which we found with both Latour and Law – a conflation 
between the idea of the properties and powers of beings and things, and the notion 
of action and the idea of agency. The retort of those such as Bennett, or Latour or 
Haraway, might be that unless we allow for the agency of things, and unless we 
decentre human language as an enabler of agency, we cannot decentre the human 
in political analysis. Bennett has rightly argued that the human/non-human 
dichotomy in political thought has not helped many of the political demands of 
humanism. Conversely however, there are serious questions to be raised about 
Bennett’s assumption that a distributed concept of agency will be effective in 
unsettling humanocentric politics.66F67   
 
Latour however, is more careful than Bennett. He wants non-human agency as a 
counter to humancentric prejudice and as a reflection of our reality as one of the 
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multitude of species situated in a range of ‘attachments’ on planet earth.67F68 This is 
necessary to accurately capture the immense causal powers of the non-human in 
our current political world. Complexity biologists with concepts of species co-
evolution and fitness landscapes and earth systems scientists encouraging humility 
by humans in the face of the powerful forces of self-regulation exerted by complex 
systems of the natural world would agree.68F69 However, the difficulty with Latour is 
that in his broad sweep, all agency is understood as of the same quality. In addition, 
it is a property of ‘things’ rather than, as complexity thinking suggests, of systems in 
relation. Like Latour, we want to be able to discuss the ways that all kinds of 
creatures, beings and things, bound up in relations of complex systems and relations 
with their system environments, are able to, in the words of Antony Giddens ‘make a 
difference in the world.’69F70 We would use a notion of agency to discuss the significant 
effects of natural systems and the beings and things caught up in them in their 
relations with other systems. We consider this to be a third kind of agency, ‘affective 
agency’. This is not simply the causal powers of a being or thing but a systemic 
impact that is collective and significant. By significant, we mean that it ‘makes a 
difference in the world’, that is, it alters the systemic conditions, the agential 
landscape, for other beings and things. The impact of global warming, or the effects 
of a viral pandemic would be examples here. 
 
We need a posthumanist account of agency that problematises rather than rejects 
outright, dualist ontologies, in the hope of shifting those binaries and challenging 
their effects on humans, non-human creatures and ‘the environment’ more broadly. 
Whereas ANT considers agency simply as a quality of material existence, we need a 
conception of agency which incorporates the idea that non-human life and non-
human animals are social actors able to exercise agency without seeing agency 
simply as a capacity that material beings can exercise. We argue therefore for a 
situated and differentiated notion of agency that understands the ability of creatures 
and things to ‘make a difference in the world’ as a question of situated relations 
rather than intrinsic capacity alone. 
 
 
Conclusion: International Relations Beyond the Human 
 
The core element of our argument is that International Relations remains dominated 
by humanocentric approaches. This places limits on what it is possible to say about 
international relations and on the ethical issues raised by human actions with regard 
to non-human nature. While some theorists have engaged with thinking about 
complexity we would argue that few have thought it through to its logical conclusion 
– the interconnectedness of systems, and the implications for agency and structure.  
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Perhaps our most significant claim is that it is possible to conceive of agency beyond 
the human. While at some level this may appear to be a controversial claim, it is not 
an unprecedented one. Fernand Braudel, for example pointed to geographic and 
climatic factors in la longue durée as being influential in the development of 
societies around the Mediterranean.70F71 Drawing upon Margaret Archer’s discussions 
of primary and corporate agency, we have developed a three-fold approach to 
thinking about structure and agency that allows us to think about agency beyond the 
human. First, reproductive agency acknowledges the way in which agential beings, 
both human and non-human, emerge into a pre-existent web of social relations and 
unequally distributed power and resources and their practices over time reproduce 
those situational constraints with relatively minor alterations. Second, there is 
transformative agency where humans and possibly some other creatures engage in a 
struggle over resources and social organization to effect differences in that 
distribution. The human world overlaps with innumerable non-human systems, both 
animate and inanimate, which can impact and influence, and indeed radically change 
the structures of the human world. We have described this third form as affective 
agency. Certainly the agency of non-human species is constricted in the extreme.  
Human institutions and social practices have effectively remade the world and our 
conditions of existence on this planet. Privileged groups of humans exercise 
considerable power over the lives of both human and non-human animals and 
intervene dramatically and often disastrously in non-human lifeworlds. But if we 
look to viruses then perhaps there is another potentially devastating story to be 
told.71F72 Hence we would argue that, if the definition of agency is the potential to alter 
structures, then this exists beyond the human. 
 
Our second point relates to issues of the analysis of agency. Complex systems can 
present problems of analysis related to unpredictability, causality, and non-linearity. 
A central feature of complex systems is the tendency for their characteristics to 
change suddenly and unexpectedly. This is not to say that patterns don’t exist. 
Sequences of behaviour and regularities can persist, but are liable to sudden changes 
without warning.72F73 Furthermore the element of unpredictability extends to questions 
of agency, as agents confront considerable problems in terms of foreseeing the 
outcomes of their actions. In other words in considering agency we need to be 
aware that the outcomes of certain actions may well be (and probably are!) rather 
different from what the actor intended. In Morin’s words, ‘action escapes the will of 
the actor.’73F74 
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Likewise interactions within complex systems are non-linear – meaning that very 
small actions can create large outcomes, while very large actions can result in 
minimal change within systems. The implication of this is that that very small actions 
by agents can potentially have rather far reaching effects. This does not mean that 
agents are not constricted by the structures within which they find themselves 
immersed. Nor does it mean that small actions can predictably be expected to have 
large outcomes. It does mean however that in thinking through issues of structures 
and agencies the link between action and outcome is undeterminable. 
 
Ultimately, in a complex world, discussion of causality is problematic. Inherent in 
complexity influenced discussions of the social world is the rejection of Newtonian 
models.74F75 In complex systems cause and the resultant effect can be non-local, but 
can also be simultaneous. Complex systems operate in a ‘tangle of actions, 
interactions, and feedback’ 75F76 meaning that discussions of ultimate causality are 
somewhat closer to guesswork. It’s not that there is no causality at work, it is just 
that the analysis of causality confronts possibly overwhelming difficulties. 
Finally, we would like to comment on posthumanism as an approach to thinking 
about international relations. Our version of posthumanism is built on a foundation 
of thinking about complexity. Complexity we have suggested is phenomena that can 
be observed in a variety of systems, human and non-human, animate and non-
animate. Complexity is neither necessarily progressive, nor teleological. Complex 
systems can collapse. The study of complexity can tell us things about the character 
of interactions, but it is not ultimately a normative account of the world. It is, rather, 
a meta-theoretical framework, within which various ontologies might be developed. 
This is why thinkers from such a wide range of perspectives have been able to 
engage with the approach. 76F77 That said, we have argued elsewhere that complexity 
thinking provides clear support for anarchist positions. 77F78 Certainly the posthumanism 
advocated here is a normative position which, in highlighting hierarchies of power 
both within human systems and particularly between human and non-human 
systems, advocates the consideration of alternative forms of organising relations 
both within the species and across species’ boundaries. In particular in thinking 
about policy issues we have suggested that a precautionary principle should 
dominate, a greater humility in terms of our embeddedness (rather than 
separateness) in non-human nature, and a priority towards the building of resilience 
within systems rather than the undermining of resilience. 78F79   
There are, we think, big questions raised by a posthumanist approach to 
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international relations and the structures and agents with which scholarship might 
be pre-occupied. Posthumanism offers an embarrassment of riches in response to 
the question of what we might be studying when we study international relations. 
The non-human world becomes more than the stuff about which political man (most 
usually) makes decisions and acts upon. Rather, the nonhuman forms the landscape 
of decision making and human endeavour. A posthuman international relations will 
be attuned to the possibilities of a fuller range of actors and constraints in any given 
context. We have argued that the impact of powerful relational human systems on 
the nonhuman lifeworld, and on vulnerable groups of humans, is deeply problematic 
and inherently unsustainable for many species, including our own. We have remade 
the conditions of life on this planet such that to speak of ‘the human’ in an exclusive 
way is untenable, and our embedded condition in what is often referred to as the 
‘environment’ must undergird our efforts in international relations scholarship. Yet 
this paper has also suggested that ‘we’ also have never been a ‘part’ and our world 
was ever more than human. Thus even the staple subject matter of international 
relations requires recasting, such as the nature of the military-industrial complex and 
the practice of war. A human soldier is a transhumanant, an uplifted human. The 
physical capacity of British troops for example, is enhanced by binoculars, gun sights 
and amphetamines. The practice of conventional warfare has long been more than 
human with the use of dogs, camels, donkeys, horses, pigeons, sea lions, dolphins as 
tools, weapons and devices for the enhancement of human capability, and the mass 
killing of nonhuman animals and degradation of vegetation is strategically common. 
The language of virus (both organic and technic) and contagion infuses debates on 
security. Even the simple broadening of the subject matter to include nonhuman 
systems and their structures and agents will result in a more comprehensive 
disciplinary frame. We would hope, however, that more critical scholarship might 
grasp the nettle of a more than human emancipatory project. 
